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CORPORATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law
The original United States Constitution. is absolutely
silent upon the subject of corporations.. The young
"fathers" of the Constitution apparently never gave the
matter of corporations a thought. This is one of the
great omissions of the original United States Constitu-
tion. Yet, by the United States Constitution, which has
been made by the Supreme Court; corporations today
are protected in most respects as much as natural per-
sons, and in some respects, more than natural persons"
although there are a few respects in which they are not
yet protected to the same extent as natural persons, but
perhaps this difference will disappear in. the course of
time. In the same way the liabilities of corporations
have been worked out under and through the judge-
made United States Constitution.
In the early history of our constitutinal law, espe-
cially in the pronouncements of Chief Justice Taney,
there obtained the restrictive or geogramhical theory of
corporations, according to which a corlm-ra!ion could
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have no legal existence outside of the boundaries of the
state by which it was created. Under this theory it
would have been difficult to have applied very many
constitutional provisions to corporations. Yet the decis-
ions of the United States Supreme Court have more
and more extended the protection of the Constitution to
corporations and have evolved the rules of the liability
of corporations according to constitutional doctrines; so
that, whether or not the Supreme Court admits it, it
has finally in fact adopted a liberal theory as to the exist-
ence of a corporation. As a consequence, the jural rela-
tions between a state, or the United States, and a cor-
poration are those existing under the functional or legal
entity theory, according to which it may have a legal
existence anywhere though incorporated only in one
state by which it was created. Under this theory it
constitutional provisions should not apply to a corpora-
tion the same as to a natural person. This article will
be concerned with the questions of the status of cor-
porations under the real present United States Consti-
tution, and of the extent to which the power of reason
has prevailed over the power of ritual.
I,
PROTECTION: 1. As CITIZENS
To what extent are corporations protected by the
United States Constitution as citizens? Corporations
are not citizens of the United States under the definition
of a citizen in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution,' and probably for this reason are
3Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas and P. R. Co., 241 U. S. 295 (1916) ; Insurance
Company v. New Orleans, Fed Cas. No. 7052 (1870).
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not protected by the clause as to abridging the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States.'
Corporations are not citizens of any state within the
meaning of Section 2, Article IV, of the United States
Constitution, so as to be entitled, in other states than
their creation, to all the privileges and immunities which
such states give to their own citizens.' For this reason,
a state may still prescribe the conditions on which a
foreign corporation may do business within its border
or exclude it altogether,' unless such foreign corpora-
tion is engaged in interstate commerce or is in the em-
ploy of the federal government.'
But a corporation is now a citizen of the state of its
creation for the purpose of federal jurisdiction on the
ground of diversity of citizenship.' The genesis of this
doctrine is interesting. At first, a corporation was not
regarded as a citizen for any purpose and it could not
get into or be taken into the federal courts on the ground
of diversity of citizenship! Then a case arose where all
2Terrell v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922), held that a state
had no power to impose on a foreign corporation a condition that it would
not sue in the federal courts, because such corporation had the privilege of
suing in the federal courts. This decision can lie rationalized only by holding
either that thereby a foreign corporation is made a citizen of the United States
under the Fourteenth Amendment; or that though it is not such a citizen, it is
a citizen for the purpose of suing in the federal courts under Section 2 o'f
Article 3 of the United States Constitution, and that therefore, a state would
be violating our doctrine of a dual form of government to interfere thus with
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The last explanation is probably the
true explanation.
'Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359 (1907) ; Blake v.
McClung, 172 U. S.-239 (1898) ; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 1(;K (1869).
'Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898) ; Paul v. Virginia. 8 Wall. 168
(1869) ; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U..S. 21. ( W09o).
'Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1878) ; Horn
Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305 (1892).
'Nashua and L. R. Corp. v. Boston and L. R. Corp., 1:16 U. S. 356 (1890).
'2 WII.OLUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1929) p.
1291.
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of the stockholders of the corporation were citizens of
the same state where the corporation was incorporated
and the plaintiff was a citizen of another state, and it
was held that the court would look behind the corporate
veil to the stockholders and give the federal courts juris-
diction because of the diversity of citizenship thus
found.' In a later case, some of the stockholders were
not citizens of the state where the corporation was in-
corporated, but of the state in which the opposing liti-
gant was a citizen. To avoid robbing the federal courts
of their jurisdiction, the Court held that for purposes of
diversity of citizenship all of the stockholders of a
corporation would be conclusively presumed to be citi-
zens of the chartering state.' This rule, however, had
to be modified later so as to make an exception in the
case of a stockholder plaintiff.'" Now it is believed that
the courts have come to the position that the corpora-
tion is itself a citizen of the state of its incorporation
for the purposes of diversity of citizenship."
However, it should be noted that a state apparently
has the power of destroying federal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations because of diversity of citizenship,
and the privilege of foreign corporations to sue in the
federal courts, by requiring incorporation in such state
'Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (1809).
'Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How. 314 (1853).
"Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905).
''St. Louis v. James, 161 U. S. 545 (1896); Doctor v. Ilarrington. 196
U. S. 579 (1905). This was so held first in the case of Louisville R. R. Co.
v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844), and Rfindle v. Canal Co.. 14 How. 90 1852)
but for fear that these cases made a corporation a citizen under all the citizen-
ship clauses, they were modified by the case of Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.,
16 How. 314 (1853), and the residence fiction of the stockholders relied upon,
but the inadequacy of this explanation has forced the courts to regard a cor-
poration as a citizen to this extent ; and probably Terrell v. Burke Construction
Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922), goes no further than this. See also Burnet v.
Commonwealth, 53 Sup. Ct. 198 (1932).
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before it will allow the corporation to do business there-
in. In such case, the corporation would be a new cor-
poration and a citizen of such state so that it would not
have the privilege of suing in the federal courts as
against the citizens of that state."
Warren is of the opinion that the framers of the
judiciary act did not contemplate the diversity clause
should apply to corporations. At first the corporations
themselves did not want the advantage of the diversity
clause and they escaped federal jurisdiction if any
stockholder was a citizen of a state with the plaintiff.
Yet little by little as shown hereafter the jurisdiction of
the federal courts was upheld as applying to corpora-
tions. The reasons given were local prejudice and the
need of inducing capital in the south and west. The
present reasons why -corporations prefer federal juris-
diction to state are to get a different substantive law
and to get a different kind of court. It is clearly true
that the reasons for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
apply with special force to corporations. Corporations
have unlimited power to influence state courts and they
are generally concerned with matters of a commercial
nature where there is a need for uniform law.'
Corporations may have been given too much protec-
tion in some respects to be referred to hereafter, but
there are some respects in which they have not been
given protection enough, and the writer submits that.
protection as a citizen is one. The Supreme Court has
made a great deal of constitutional law for corporations
in the matter of citizenship, but it has not yet made
enough. The discriminations of the various states
"Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931).
"aWarren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L.R.'4v. 661
(1933).
6 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
against foreign corporations not engaged in interstate
commerce or in the employ of the federal government,
especially in the matter of taxation, are so unfair as to
be almost scandalous. Why, simply because they hap-
pen to be incorporated in a sister state, should one state
be allowed to extort of foreign corporations levies
which it does not exact from domestic corporations?
The Constitution does not permit it to do such a thing
in case of natural persons. It would seem that every
argument for one should apply to the other. Natural
persons are protected by the interstate (rights) privi-
leges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 20,
and corporations should receive this same protection.
All it would be necessary to do to accomplish this result
would be for the Supreme Court to declare that cor-
porations are citizens for this protection. This step
would be much shorter than other steps it has taken,
and would seem to be the natural culmination of what
it has already done.
PROTECTION: 2. AS PERSONS
To what extent are corporations protected as persons
under the United States Constitution? The answer to
this question is that they as to their property have
as full and complete protection as natural persons.
Corporations are persons, though they are artificial per-
sons, but they are just as real entities as natural per-
sons. At first, the protection of the due process clause
and the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was extended only to negroes." Then the protection of
these clauses was extended to the protection of natural
persons, first, as to procedure," and then as to matters
"Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
"Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
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of substance," and finally, largely through the influence
of Justice Field, their protection was extended to the
property rights of corporations."
It is true the protection of the equality clause extends
only to persons "within" the jurisdiction of a state, and
a corporation not engaged in interstate commerce or in
the employ of the federal government would be subject
to the power of the state in getting into the state or
staying in the state, so that the protection of the equal-
ity clause would mean very little." But recently, in the
case of Kentucky Finance Corporation v. Paramount Auto-
mobile Company," the Supreme Court seemed to extend
the protection of the equality clause to the protection
of a foreign corporation in the matter of suit in a state
court, even though not within the jurisdiction of a state.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that a Kentucky
corporation could go into Wisconsin and sue to replevin
an automobile without submitting to examination as
required by a statute applying only to foreign corpo-
rations. But apparently the Wisconsin law permitted
foreign corporations to sue in its courts, so that it might
be contended that the corporation was within the state
and therefore entitled to the protection of the equality
clause. Yet, the language of the court is broad enough
to support the proposition that a state may not bar
a foreign corporation from legitimate resort to its
courts."
The due process clause has been invoked to protect
corporations against taxation, except at their situs, both
"Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878).
"Minneapolis v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1889); Covington v. Sandford,
164 U. S. 578 (1896).
"Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898).
"s262 U. S. 544 (1923).
"79 U. oF PA. L. Rzv., 962-4 (1931).
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as to general property taxes' and inheritance taxes"
on land and tangible chattels, unless under the unit
rule," or unless the tangible chattels have no situs;"
and on intangible chattels, unless they have acquired
a busin'ess situs, except at the domicile of the owner
(creditor) which in the case of a corporation is the state
of incorporation," and this rule applies though the in-
tangibles are evidenced by tangibles." It thus protects
corporations against multi-taxation by different states.
The due process clause also protects corporations as
much as natural persons against the taking of their
property by eminent domain" or by the police power."
Public utilities especially have received protection as to
their rates of return and rate bases.
A corporation has been protected as a person in
many other incidental 'Ways. Thus, it has been given
the right as a person to file a mechanic's lien," to obtain
the protection of bankruptcy laws," and to petition to
quiet title."
Corporations arc protected by the provision of Section
10, Article I, of the United States Constitution against
laws impairing the obligation of contracts. In the
"Union Refrig. Tr. Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
"Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
"New York, etc. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906).
"Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
"Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1931); Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69 (1926).
't*Ridler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1 (1930).
"State ex rl.'Tacoma Ice Co. v. White River Power Co., 39 Vash. 648,
82 Pac. 150 (1903) ; Long Island W. Sup. Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685
(1897).
"Reagen v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
"Chatnian v. Brewer, 43 Neb. 890, 62 N. W. 320 (1895).
"Barth v. Bachus, 140 N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. 425 (1893).
"°Proprietors v. Inhabitants of Ipswich, 153 Mass. 42, 26 N. E. 239 (1891).
CORPORATIONS .. I) THEI U. S. CONSTITUTION
Dartmouth College Case," the United States Supreme
Court held that a corporate charter was a contract
entitled to such protection. Subsequent cases inter-
preted this protection to mean that such charters were
not subject to the state's subsequent exercise of its
police power, or power of taxation, or perhaps even of
eminent domain." This was giving corporations
greater protection than has ever been given natural per-
sons, and is largely responsible for the great develop-
ment of the corporation method of business organiza-
tion in the United States, which has finally resulted in
making our civilization a corporate civilization. It is
true that the Supreme Court finally made the protection
of corporate charters subject to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain," and to the exercise of the
police power," except in the case of rates of public utili-
ties;" but it is still held that corporate charters are not
subject to the exercise of the police power in the matter
of rates of public utilities and in the matter of taxation.'"
Corporations are protected as much as natural per-
sons against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Corporations are not protected by the constitutional
guaranty against self-crimination, on the theory that
the constitutional protection was not intended for those
."4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
"Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co.. 1 Wall. 116 (1864) l iqi1: Bank v.
Knoop, 14; flow. :69 (185).
3 Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 ( 1X97) ; West River
Bridge Co. v. I)ix, 6 How. 507 (1849).
"Stone v. Mississippi. 101 U. S. 814 (1880): Illiois () i 0 1ll:d Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, 1.16 U. S. :187 (1892).
"Colunbus 1y., Power & light Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919).
"L1ake Supriir (,misdidaltd Iron Mines v. Lord, 271 U. S. 577 (1926)
Roberts & Schaefrc, Co,. v. I"imerson, 271 U. S. -50 (1926).
"Hale v. I lenkle. 2L0 U..S. ,:i (1906).
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who could not be punished criminally." But now that
corporations are becoming more and more amenable to
criminal law, it may be argued that the rule should be
changed."
Is a corporation entitled to a jury trial in either a
criminal case or a civil case? It would seem that a
corporation should be entitled to the right to a jury
trial in both civil and criminal cases, but the question
might be a little more difficult in a criminal case.-0
The power of eminent domain is inherent in sover-
eignty. Constitutional recognition of its existence is
unnecessary. It is also implied that the exercise of this
sovereign power is delegated to the state. Express
delegation is unnecessary." Yet this sovereign power
may in turn be delegated by the state either to other
governmental subdivisions or to private corporations,
provided the exercise of the power involves the taking
of property for a public use only. Corporations engaged
in businesses affected with a public interest (public
callings) are performing such a governmental function
that the taking of property for their own uses is a public
use and therefore constitutional."
The commerce clause protects corporations as natural
persons against taxation by the states for the privilege
"Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
"Silverthorn v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) 27 MICH. L. Ryv. 471
(1929).
"State v. Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky, 120 Tenn. 86, 110 S. W. 565
(1908).
'United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883) ; People v. Adirondack Ry.
Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689 (1899).
"Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (1883) ; In re Niagara Falls & W. Ry.
Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 42) (1888) ; Nolan v. Central Ga. Power Co.,
134 Ga. 201, 67 S. E. 656 (1910) ; Evergreen Cemetery Association v. Beecher,
53 Conn. 551, 5 At. 353 (1885).
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of doing interstate commerce," although they are sub-
ject to non-discriminatory property taxes;'" and license
taxes for use of highways and other privileges;" and
against the exercise of the police power of the states
over interstate commerce where the federal govern-
ment's power is exclusive," except where it is the states'
general police power and not a direct regulation of
interstate commerce."
The commerce clause protects corporations engaged
in interstate commerce, although not natural persons
and other corporations, against suit in a state other
than its incorporation on a transitory cause of action
which has arisen in another state, because the Supreme
Court has said this is a burden on interstate commerce."
It would seem that it would have been better for the
Supreme Court to have rested its decision on the denial
of due process. Then all corporations, and also natural
persons, would have been protected.
The commerce clause also guarantees the right to sue
in a state court on interstate. business done in that state
without complying with state restrictions as to appoint-
ment of a resident agent or filing of a charter."
Corporations as persons are protected as much as
"Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (1872) McCall v. California,
136 U. S. 104 (1890).
"Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885) ; St. Louis v.
Nattin, 277 U. S. 157 (1928).
"Pocket Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (1873) ; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543
(1886) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1016).
"Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1878) ; Buck v.
Kuykendal, 267 U. S. 307 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Attleboro, 273 U. S.
83 (1927).
"Smith v. St. Louis and S. W. Ry., 181 U. S. 248 (101); Sherlock v.
Ailing, 93 U. S. 99 (1876).
"Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923) ; Denver
v. Terte, 52 Sup. Ct. 152 (1932).
"Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197 (1914).
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natural persons by the constitutional guaranty of free-
dom of speech and the press, as is shown by the follow-
ing cases where the courts hold that the constitutional
guaranty does not apply because of exceptions to the
rule.*
Corporations as persons are protected as much as
natural persons by the constitutional guaranty against
double jeopardy."
As a result of all the protection given to corporations
by the United States Constitution the growth of cor-
porations in the United States has been nothing less
than marvelous.
Before 1800 there were only 335 profit seeking cor-
porations; 219 of these were turnpike, bridge and canal
corporations: 67 of these were banking and insurance
corporations: 36 of these were water and fire protection
corporations; only 6 were manufacturing corporations.
In 1813 there was organized the Boston Manufactur-
ing Company concerned with textiles. This corpora-
tion introduced many of the present characteristics of
corporations. But the growth of corporations in the
textile industry stood still after the conclusion .of the
Civil. \Var so that today the textile industry has not
become quasi public in the sense that the public gener-
ally' is the owner of the stock.
There was great development among railroads in the
"Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 215 Fed. 138 (D. C.
Ohio, 1914: Same. 236 U. S. 230 (1915) (not press) ; United States v. Toledo
Newspaper Co.. 220 Fed. 458 (D. C. Ohio, 1915) ; Same,,i,7 Fed. 986
(C. C. A. 6th, 1916) (contempt) ; Mutual Film Corp. v. Chicago. 224 Fed.
101 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915) (films) ; Deiner v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co., 230 Mo.
613, 132 S. W. 1143 (1910) (libel) ; Kelley v. Independent Pub. Co., 45 Mont.
127, 122 Pac. 735 (1912) (libel) ; Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 11: Va.
156, 73 S. E. 472 (1912) (libel).
"Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., 120 Ky. 724, 90 S. W. 233 (1905)
State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N. W. 935 (1906).
CORPORATIONS AND TEI U. S. CONSTIT1'7 (.)N
ante-bellum period. The New York Central Railroad
was created in 1853 by the grouping of various rail-
roads. Since the Civil War quasi public corporations
have dominated the fi'eld of the rails. In 1930., 14 of
these systems operated 81 per cent. of all the mileage
in the United States.
Other aspects of. our economic life have come under
the sway of the corporation. This is almost universally
true in banking, insurance and utilities. In mining and
quarrying 93 per cent. of the business was conducted
by corporations in 1919. In manufacturing 66 per cent.
of the business was conducted by corporations in 1899,
87 per cent. in 1919 and 94. per cent. in 1933. The sway
of the corporation has been delayed in certain other
aspects of our economic life so that in clothing only 54
per cent. of the industry is dominated by corporations,
in bread and baking only 51 per cent., in millinery only
46 per cent., in automobile repairing only 39 per cent.
In mercantile business in general the corporation is just
beginning to dominate. In 1909 the corporation domi-
nated only 30 per cent. of the wholesale business and
15 per cent. of the retail business, but in 1925 it domi-
nated 40 per cent. of the wholesale business and 30 per
cent. of the retail. Forty to 60 per cent. of the construc-
tion work is done by corporations. Much of our real
estate is held by corporations. In the case of municipal
corporations operation is by managers but, outside -f
such corporations as the Port of New York Authority
and the Tennessee Valley Authority, stock ownership
is not widely dispersed. But corporations have made
the least headway in agriculture where they (minilate
only 4 per cent. of the enterprise.
Enough figures have been given to show how com-
pletely our economic life has become dominated hv
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corporations.' Corporations have now gathered prop-
erty under their system. Corporations control the
production and the distribution of products, and almost
all other aspects of our economic life so that our civili-
zation has in a real sense become a corporate civili-
zation.
The evolution of the corporate structure also has been
almost startling.
In England in the eighteenth century a corporation
was a franchise, that is, a privilege granted with the
grant of other privileges. The main characteristic of
the corporation at this time was the limited liability
of stockholders. In the beginning the charter of the
corporation embodied all of the arrangements and was
a contract between the corporation and the state
(though there was no corporation yet), between the
stockholders and the corporation, and between the
stockholders inter se.
In the United States in the early nineteenth century
it was customary to grant special charters to corpora-
tions. Under ihese, corporations were state controlled
and there was a real agreement between the parties.
This agreement undertook to protect the interest of the
public, the interest of the creditor, and the interest of
shareholders. By statute, limitations were imposed
upon the scope of management, for the protection of
the public and the shareholders; upon the supervision
of payment for stock, so that no one would share in the
profits unless he contributed to the original funds, so as
to protect the creditors and the shareholders;and upon
the capital structure set up. By the common law at
this time control was in the shareholders. They had
pre-emptive rights. dividends were paid only out of stir-
pluses and while the corporation could be changed by
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contract the contract had to be supervised by the state.
Management was a set of agents running the business
for a set of owners and accountable to them.
Beginning with the general incorporation laws of
1837 in Connecticut and running to the end of the nine-
tenth century corporations were allowed to engage
in any lawful business. Large scale production was
introduced and the growth in the number of share-
holders began. With the introduction of this method
of incorporation the legislature was eliminated and only
the Secretary of State appeared for the government.
While charters were still called contracts they were
drafted solely by the incorporators or their attorneys
and were buried with the Secretary of State. No one,
save the clerks and the incorporators, knew their con-
tents. The rigid requirements for the protection of the
various parties interested in the corporation were
broken down. As a consequence many new and little
understood characteristics were introduced into the
corporate structure.
One of these characteristics was the weakening of
control by the stockholders over the direction of the
enterprise. This was brought about through the use
of proxies, through the limitation of the right to remove
directors during their term, through the provision of
amendment by a two-thirds majority, through the dele-
gating of powers to Voting trusts, through non-voting
stock, and through the sale of property.
Another characteristic was.the elimination Of. state
supervision over the contributions of capital. With this
lack of supervision property as well as caslh was paid
for stock and non-par stock was issued.
Another characteristic was the diminution Of the right
to invest additional monies. Pre-emptiveri.lhts were
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eliminated if more shares were authorized in the original
charter, or if stock was issued for property, or if the
right was waived in the charter (as in many Delaware
corporations).
Another characteristic was the modification of the
restrictions on dividends. One device to accomplish
the purpose of issuing dividends was through "paid in
surpluses" in over-par and non-par stock. Delaware
laws permit dividends though there are no profits.
Another characteristic was the elimination of the
right to a fixed capital structure and a fixed place
therein, by an insertion in the charter of the power to
amend either by state authority or by action of major-
ity against others.
Another characteristicwas the limitation of the right
in the future of the enterprise. This was brought to
pass through the use of "stock purchase warrants" (a
Delaware device), option, or unissued stock of fixed
price.
In addition the inside group in corporations has
acquired the power to route the earnings. In the case
of non-cumulative preferred no dividends can be de-
clared. In class A and class B stock the inside group
can increase the stock of one class so that others can
get more earnings and can use the surplus to buy in
one class of stock. In the case of stock dividends they
can declare a dividend to common stock, for example.
They also can take advantage of stock purchase war-
rants, already referred to, can control the accounting.
and can control earnings through the pyranmiding of
holding companies. All of these materially affect the
c,,ners of the corporation. ,\s a consequence share-
holders have snrrendcred a sol of definite rights for a
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set of indefinite expectations which normally cannot be
enforced.
The inside group also has the power to affect credi-
tors. This they can do through ;L power to alter the
original contract either by amendment or merger. The
contract between the shareholders and the corporation
is not affected by the reserve power of the state. There-
fore, it is a proper exercise of the police power for the
state itself to make such changes or to confer -the power
on the majority."
II.
LIABILITY: 1. CORPORATIONS ENGAGED
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Constitution of the Constitutional Convention
does not expressly give the federal government the
power to tax interstate commerce, but this power would
undoubtedly be implied, although as yet the federal
government has not tried to exercise this power. In
the same way this Constitution does not expressly deny
the power of taxation to the various state governments,
but the Supreme Court has written into our Constitu-
tion a limitation that the state governments cannot tax
interstate commerce, evidently on the theory that it
would interfere with the federal government's regula-
tion of interstate commerce.". Hence, as we have seen
above, a state cannot impose a tax on a foreign corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce for the privilege
of doing interstate commerce." fut a state may tax a
foreign corporation for the privilege of doing local
"aBERLE AND MEANS, Till: MODERN CORPORATION AND 'RIVATE PROPERTY
(1933).
"Case of State Freight Tax, IJr Wall. 232 (1873).
"Pensacola v. Western'Union Tc. Co., C6 U. S. 1 (I878).
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business, even though it is also engaged in interstate
commerce, provided it does not base its fee on the total
authorized capital stock of the corporation or otherwise
burden interstate commerce;" and a state may levy an
excise tax on a corporation engaged in interstate com-
merce for the privilege of using the state's highways ;-
and the Supreme Court now permits a state to levy a non-
discriminatory property tax upon all the land" and tan-
gible chattels" of a corporation located within the state.
and onl goods carried even though still in the original
package, if they have become a part of the general mass
of property of the state," though not upon intangibles
unless the corporation -is chartered by such state;.
although under the unit rule, a state may tax a pro-
portion both of tangibles and intangibles." A state
may also levy a gross receipts tax in lieu of property
taxes;" and after interstate commerce has ended and
intrastate commerce begun, the state can, of course,
levy property taxes."
Vhile a state cannot levy an excise tax on a corpora-
tion whose business is wholly interstate," and perhaps
not an income tax unless on the ground of citizenship,"
yet if the corporation is within the state the latter can
"East Ohio Co. v. Ohio Tax Commission, 283 U. S. 465 (1931): Cudahay
v. Henkle, 278 U. S. 460 (1929).
"New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U. S. 338 (1930).
"Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
"Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. IS (1891).
"Brown v. Houston, 1i4 U. S. 622 (1885). Import cases contra: Anglo
Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 53 Sup. Ct. 373 (1933).
"Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930).
"Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185 (1897).
"United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912).
"77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 918 (1929).
'Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 260 U. S. 203 (1925).
"'Cook v. Tait. 265 U. S. 47 (1924) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission.
2S.6 U. S. 276 (1932),
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probably levy an excise tax for the privilege of doing
state business even if there is no income attributable to
the state." A state may levy an income tax on a foreign
corporation engaged in interstate commerce if it relies
on some sort of allocation formula whereby it segre-
gates the -income from within the state from that with-
out the state, as, for example, such part of the corpo-
ration's .income as is represented by the proportion
between the taxable property within the state and the
total property of the corporation," if reasonable," and
for purposes of taxation a corporation and its stock-
holders are clearly held to be separate entities."
The federal government has a complete police power
over corporations engaged in interstate commerce,"
and under this power the federal government may also
regulate intrastate commerce where intrastate and inter-
state commerce are so united that it is necessary to reg-
ulate both in order to regulate interstate commerce."
0
But in spite of the federal government's power, the Su-
preme Court has held that the various state govern-
ments have a concurrent police power* in the absence of
federal action where the matter is not national in scope,"
and even where the federal government's power i:s
exclusive, it has held that the state governments have
"Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922); Detroit Inter-
national Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, :i Sup.
Ct. 137. (1932).
"Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax ComriIssion. %2if U. S. 271 (1924).
"Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 12: (1931).
"Burnet v. Commonwealth, 53 Sup. Ct. 198 (1932) :)alti v. Bowers,
53 Sup. Ct. 205 (1932).
44HUGHZS, Tne SuPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (I 192s) p. 137.
"Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Georgia 'oblic Service Com-
mission v. United States, 283 U. S. 765 (1913)..
"Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851).
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an incidental or indirect power of regulation." But the
Supreme Court has held that it is a burden on interstate
commerce for a state court to take jurisdiction .of a
transitory cause of action against a non-resident cor-
poration not doing business in the state," or to require
appointment of a resident agent or filing of charter
as conditions precedent to suing in its courts."
LIABILITY: 2. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS NOT ENGAGED
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A foreign corporation not engaged in interstate com-
merce may be taxed by the states through excise taxes
practically at their whim, unless the corporation is
within the taxing state, since in that case it is not en-
titled to the protection of the equality clause," and even
as to corporations within the state it is generally a
proper classification to tax corporations and no one else,
or to tax certain corporations and not other corpora-
tions."
Except where intrastate commerce is bound up with
interstate commerce, a state has a full and complete
police power over all foreign corporations within its
jurisdiction, except that it must not deny the corpora-
tion due process of law" -and the privilege of suing in
the federal- courts." It may prescribe any condition it
chooses as a condition to giving a corporation the privi-
lege of doing business in the state," with the possible
"Public Utilities Commission v. Attlehoro Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
"Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Fquity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1.23).
"Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197 (1914).
"Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898).
"State Board of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931).
"Covington v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578 (1896).
"Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922).
"Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 1i: (1928).
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exception of the privilege of suing in its courts. ' * or the
federal courts.". But even if it could not impose these
conditions directly, it could accomplish the same result
by requiring a foreign corporation to incorporate in the
state as a condition precedent to doing business in the
state."
Foreign corporations are not protected by the con-
tract clause against tax or other action by other states
unless they have made new contracts with such states
as by permission to do business therein under their
exiting laws."' Bankruptcy laws, though they override
provisions in contracts, are apparently not inhibited by
the contract clause or by the due process clause."
It was held at first that a state could acquire no juris-
diction over a foreign corporation, even though it was
doing business within th& state, since there was no
possibility of service on it. This position was a two-
fold result both- of the doctrine of jurisdiction and of
the concept of a corporation. The original Anglo-
"Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto. Corp., 262 U. S. 544 (1923).
"Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922).
"2Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U. S. -It0 (19:11).
"American Smelting.and Refining Co. v. Coloradh. 20-1 U. S. 103 (1907).
"Canada So. R. R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 536 (188:3); In r,
Franklin Brewery Co., 249 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1918) ; Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213 (1827); did not see that a subsequent state bankruptcy law
might possibly -be a proper exercise of the police power, but the above cases
seem to uphold a subsequent federal bankruptcy law on this theory since,
though the federal government is not limited by a contract clause, due process
protects against the impairment of the obligation of a contract, United States
v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 256 U. S. 51 (1921), and therefore limits
the power of the federal government as much as the contract clause limits
the power of the states. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (187O) ; Atlantic
Coast Line v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548 (1913). If this is true, the
same thing should be true of state moratoriums on ihe period of redemption
of mortgages and bank deposit withdrawals, but former state stay laws have
generally been declared unconstitutional unless making only slight changes in
remedies. 27 ILL. L. Ricv. 799 (1933).
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American notion of jurisdiction was that of the physical
power which the court had, if need be, to lay the defend-
ant by the heels. This required actual physical pres-
ence." The original notion of a corporation was that
it was a metaphysical entity and could have legal exist-
ence only within the state of its creation. Hence, it
could not be physically present in any other state so as
to give such state jurisdiction over it. The law of pri-
vate corporations is an outgrowth of the law of munici-
pal corporations. Of course, a municipal corporation
could not migrate, and the courts, therefore, at first
took the position that a private corporation could not
migrate."
The results of such a holding as the above were very
unfortunate. A corporation could be sued only in the
state where it was incorporated. This involved expense
of travel and difficulty of getting witnesses, as well as
the necessity of suing on a judgment where the corpo-
ration had no property in the state of its incorporation.
In some cases, where the suit was local in character,
there could be no relief. Consequently, the states, by
statute, undertook to change the situation so as to make
corporations liable to suit in the state courts, and the
courts upheld these statutes not only in the case of
foreign corporations not engaged in interstate com-
merce, but also in the case of those engaged in inter-
state commerce.
The basis for rationalization of the new jurisdiction
thus given to the states has caused a great deal of
trouble. There have been five main methods of explain-
ing their jurisdiction: (a) consent; (b) submission: (c)
" Collins v. Page, Style's Reports 124 (1649).
"Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (1839) ; McQueen v. Middle-
town Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 6 (1819).
CORPORATIONS AND THE U. S. CONSTITUTION
doing an act which a state could forbid; (d) presence
in the state; and (e) propriety and convenience. The
first ground on which jurisdiction was based was that
of consent." Since the state had the power to keep a
foreign corporation out of the state, it could, as a con-
dition of allowing it to come into the state, require it
to consent to the appointment of an agent for the serv-
ice of process, etc., but when the jurisdiction was up-
held against a corporation which was engaged only in
interstate commerce which the state could not prohibit,
the consent theory broke down." The submission
theory is a good deal like the consent theory in that it
holds that when a corporation does business in the state
it submits to certain reasonable laws regarding juris-
diction and it encounters the same difficulty as the con-
sent theory. The theory that doing an act which the
state could forbid subjects the corporation to the state's
jurisdiction has been championed by a magazine writer
but has not found support in the cases." It means that-
if one does an act or causes an event within the state
which, under the laws of the state at that time, subjects
him to jurisdiction, that is a sufficient basis. The theory
of presence in the state is probably the strongest theory
upon which a state's jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions can be made to rest." When is a corporation
present in the state? It has generally been said that
when it is doing business in the state. But when is a
corporation doing business in a state? Perhaps a safe
"Lafayette Insurance Company v. French, 18 How. 404 (1s:..,); St. Clair v.
Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882).
'International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
"Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 HARV. L. REv. 563
(1926).
"International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914) ; Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahay Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1924).
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test would be that it is doing business in a state whenever
it does permanent or continuous acts which constitute
some substantial part of its ordinary and principal busi-
ness. Stimson has suggested as a test for the presence
theory a very practical and simple test. According to
his test a state would have jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation whenever one or more of its agents or ser-
vants, acting in its behalf, is within the territory of
the state. °" The adoption of the presence theory did
not, however, mean the discarding of the consent
theory." The explanation of propriety and convenience
is the civil law rule which gives that court or state jur-
isdiction which ought to exercise it, and there is some
indication that Anglo-American law is tending towards
the civil law position." Hence, now on one theory or
another, foreign corporations are subjected to suits in
the courts of any state as much as natural persons,
except in the case of transitory causes of action involv-
ing foreign corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, in giving effect to the
diverse citizenship clause, limited suits brought in the
circuit courts to districts wherein the defendant was an
inhabitant or could be found. While the old classical
theory obtained that a corporation could have no exist-
ence beyond the territorial limits of the state of its
origin, it followed that a corporation could not be an
"aStimson, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 18 ST. Louis L. Rzv.
195 (1933).
"Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115 (1914) ; Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v.
Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1916) L.. & NT. Ry. Co. v.
Chatters. 279 U. S. 320 (1929).
"Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927); Davidson v. Daugherty, 241
N. W. 700 (Iowa, 1931) ; Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MINN.
L. Rv. 146 (1933).
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inhabitant or found in other states. Thus, corporations
were able to evade suits in federal courts, even in states,
where they carried on business. This early position
was later circumvented by the doctrine of consent where
a state provided by statute for the appointment of an
agent to accept service as a condition precedent to doing
business, and later where two states had no such statute
on the theory that the corporation was found in any
state wherein it did business. Finally, the Judicature
Act was amended in 1887 by omitting the words "in
which he shall be found" thus leaving federal jurisdic-
tion -for diverse citizenship to suits brought in the dis-
trict whereof either the plaintiff or the defendant was
an inhabitant. Since it is held that a corporation* is
an inhabitant of only the state of its origin, it follows
that today a corporation may be sued in the federal
courts of its chartering state only by non-residents,
and in the federal courts of other states if doing busi-
ness therein, by residents.'.
At the present time it is popular for most corporations
to incorporate in Delaware, New Jersey. and a few
other favorite states. Why is this? Because those
states, especially Delaware, have lax corporation laws
such as the corporations .want but the people generally
do not want corporations to have. Delaware has these
laws because it brings corporations to it and corpora-
tions bring revenue. In other words, Delaware is work-
ing this racket on the other states because. of the money
the corporations pay her for doing so. She now gets
four or five millions a year from initial incorporation
fees and annual franchise taxes, and. it has been sug-
gested that she could obtain enough revenue so that she
could abolish all other taxes. The laws which she gives
"79 U. op PA. L. Riiv. 96!; (1931) ; ii TEx. L. REv. 359 (1933).
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corporations in exchange for this revenue permit: (a)
directors not to be stockholders; (b) officers and direc-
tors not to reside in the state; (c) directors' meetings to
be held outside the state but not stockholders' meetings
(whotherefore never attend meetings) ; (d) directors to
issue new stock without the approval of the stock-
holders; (e) the election of directors to be by a limited
class of stockholders; (f) issuance of stock for property,
services, rights, and the products of one's brain; (g)
issuance of stock without par value; (h) issuance of
stock purchase warrants (whereby directors may gam-
ble without risk); (i) a majority of the board to con-
stitute a quorum; (j) Wilmington trust companies to
furnish office boy incorporators."
In this way, other states not only lose their share
of the revenue which Delaware gets, but they have
turned loose to prey upon them a flood of piratically
organized corporations out to fleece other states, the
public, their own stockholders and anyone not a direc-
tor. No wonder the states in turn try to prey upon
such corporations by tax and police power laws. If
the corporations are to be protected against the states,
the states must also be protected against the corpora-
tions, and it is believed the states and federal govern-
ment have a ready weapon -available to break up the
game of racketeering of Delaware and all other states
like her, and that is .federal incorporation of all corpo-
rations engaged in interstate commerce and state rein-
corporation of all other foreign corporations."
LIABILITY: 3. DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS
Just as domestic corporations are protected by the
"i5o Altantic Monthly 268.
"Stipra note 82.
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Constitution, so far as concerns property, to the same,
and, in the case of contracts, to a greater extent, than
natural persons", so they also in general have the same
liabilities as natural persons. They are subject to the
same powers of taxation, the same power. of eminent
domain, and the same police power. The cases hereto-
fore cited are sufficient authority for this general pro-
position." A few special applications of the police
power will be adverted to.
It is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation
of contracts made by a corporation with third parties
to dissolve a corporation whether or not a power to
repeal has been reserved," provided creditors are not
deprived of the right to resort to the property of the
corporation," but it would impair'the contract between
the corporation and the state'to dissolve a corporation
unless there is some act or neglect constituting a cause
for forfeiture or the power to repeal has been reserv-
ed." As to whether it is constitutional for a state to
authorize a majority of the stockholders of a corporation
to amend its charter so as to issue no par stock in lieu
of existing stock, or to change voting powers of stock-
holders, or to authorize it to engage in a new business,
or to merge with another corporation, there is a conflict
in the decisions, but the better view is that this is not
an impairment of the contract between the corporation
and dissenting stockholders even where the power to
annul has not been reserved if the corporation, if not a
public utility, is required to buy the stock of such dis-
senting stockholders at full value if they so elect and
"Supra notes 6, 40.
"Mumma. v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281 (1834).
"1.othrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 584 (1875) ; Commonwealth v. F.ssex Co.,
13 Gray 239 (1859).
"Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819).
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this view has abundant support if the power to ainul
has been reserved.'"' The basis for this rule in all cases
is that such action is a proper exercise of the police
power to which all contracts are generally subject.
In some states constitutional prohibitions now forbid
the creation of corporations by special acts, or the con-
ferring of, corporate powers by such acts, though in the
absence of such prohibitions corporations may still be
created by special acts,' but even under such provisions
it is constitutional for a legislature to change the name
of a corporation by special act, unless general laws
otherwise provide.'"
The enactment of statutes providing for the inspec-
tion of the books and other records of a corporation
at reasonable times by the stockholders and creditors is
a proper exercise of the police power and does not im-
pair the obligation of any contract or deprive the cor-
poration of its property without due process of law. '0
It is due process of law to punish a corporation for
contempt to the same extent as a natural person, and
the fact that an officer of the corporation through whom
the contempt was committed may also be punished is
no defense. This power exists independently of statute
and cannot be curtailed by statute since it would be
'Canada So. R. Co. v. Gebbard, 109 U. S. 527 (1883) ; Hale v. Cheshire
R. Co.. 161 Mass. 443, 37 N. E. 307 (1893) ; Market St. R. Co. v. Hellman,
109 Cal. 571. 42 Pac. 225 (1895) ; McKec v. Chautauqua Assembly, 130 Fed.
526 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1904) Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 108 N. Y. S. 978
(1908): Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717. 75 S. E. 305 (1012)
Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 251, 89 So. 70 (1921).
'Oregon Ry. & N. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1 (188) : School
District. No. 56 v. St. Joseph F. & M.1. Co., 103 U. S. 707 (1880).
'""N\\allace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 116. (1877) Hazelett v. Butler University,
st1 Ind. 230 (1S2).
'°"Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co. 2!, I11. 170. 92 N. E. 643 (1910);
Schmidt v. Anderson. 29 N. 1). 262, 150 N. \V. 871 (1915).
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a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.-Stockholders may be held liable to pay any balance
on unpaid stock, though they, in addition, are under a
statutory liability imposed at the time of the creation
of the corporation and to refund dividends paid them
where the corporation is insolvent.'"
It is due process of law to punish corporations for
many crimes and the whole modern tendency of the
law is to subject corporations, as nearly as may be, to
the same criminal law as individuals."' Prima facie. the
word person in a penal statute includes corporations. ' "
Congress has power, under the. Interstate Commerce
Clause, to regulate corporations as it has done in the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, and it has no con-
tract clause limiting its power, but only the due process
clause.'"
Blue sky laws can be passed by the states without
interfering with interstate commerce or violating the
equality or due process clauses.'
Public utility companies can, under the due process
clause, be subjected to the social control, called the law
of public callings,'" and may be regulated by public
service commissions without violating the doctrine of
'Fielder v. Bambrick Bro's. Construction Co., 162 Mo. App. 528, 142 S. W.
1111 (1912) ; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1908)
Merchants' Stock & Gas Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 8th,
1912); Same, 223- U. S. 639 (1912).
'"Randall Printing Co. v. Sanitas. Mineral Water Co., 120 Minn. 268, 139
N. W. 606. (1913) ; Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56 (1891).
"'Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 8th,
1914); Southern Express Co. v. State, I Ca. App. 700. 58 S. E. 67 (1907).
"*'Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People. 32 Coo. 263, 75 -ac. 924 (1907).
"'United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (1898) ; Nash v.
United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 234 Fed. 127 (D. C. Mo., 1916).
"'Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.. 242 U. S. 539 (1917).
"Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
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delegation of powers or separation of powers.'
The practice of law by corporations is illegal. A
statute so prohibiting is a proper exercise of the police
power and without a statute the court may declare it
illegal because of the judicial power created by the doc-
trine of separation of powers.'
HII.
In some respects it is apparent corporations have been
given too much protection and too little liability. Public
utility corporations, for example, have been given too
much protection in the matter of their rates and their
rate bases. Corporations are still given too much pro-
tection in the matter of taxation and the matter of
utility franchises and rates under the contract clause.
Corporations incorporated in Delaware and other states
copying Delaware have been given too many advan-
tages. There has not been enough federal taxation of
interstate commerce. Perhaps corporations also should
be subject to greater income taxes and to more price
fixing. But on the whole what is wanted is not so much
new law as better application of our present laws. Some
of the old law has already been sufficiently reformed.
There is need outside of a few states for little further
reformation. What then should be the changes in the
future in the social control of corporations? For the
most part the social control of the future must have a
change in objective.
"'Louisville & N R. Co.v. Garrett, 231 U. S.'298 (1913).
"'Meisel & Co. v. National Jewelers' Board of Trade, 152 N. Y. S. 913
(1915); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
The practice of dentistry by corporations may also be prohibited in the exer-
cise of the police power. Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 84
Cal. Dec. 223 (1932). But the exercise of the police power in this type of
cases seems to be limited to the learned professions. 21 CAT.ir. L. Rev. 279
(1933).
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The old viewpoint with regard to corporations was
that the owners of the property should be protected,
and that those in control were merely trustees for such
owners. Some contend that this should be the future
reform of our corporations, but with the wide disper-
sion of ownership in many corporations the owners now
have become so inactive and irresponsible that this re-
form is not feasible.
Another view which might be taken would be to pro-
tect those in control, which is our present plan. The
only result of this system of corporate management is
corporate plundering. Whatever might is able to do is
made right.
A third view and the one which should be taken is
that corporations must serve society. Wages and se-
curity must be given by them to their employees; serv-
ices must be given to the public and stabilization must
be given to business. People must realize that the cor-
poration is one form of social organization. It is a
dominant institution of our modern world, but it must
be controlled for the common good. Economic power
can now compete on even terms with political power. In
the future either the corporation must be dominated
by the state or the state must become the corporation.
